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TH.E LEGAL PRO.CURATOR 
(PART II) 
MAURICE CARUANA CURRAN 
The first part of this article was published in the last edition of 
the Law Journal. 
III QUALIFICATIONS (cont.) 
WHEN eventually the new Laws of Organization and Civil. Procedure 
were promulgated (Ordinance No. IV of 1854) the qualifications set 
out at Sections 101 to 103 were the following: (a) Warrant from the 
Governor; (b) Oaths of Allegiance and Office; ( c) good conduct and 
good morals; (d) a native born British .subject; (e) possession of a 
Lyceum and University certificate of a good · knowledge of arithme-
tic and handwriting, and of having, after being admitted to the Uni-
versity, attended therein the lectures prescribed for legal procura-
tors; (f) practice for a period of not less than a year with a pra·ctis· 
ing advocate; (g) examination by two judges and certification by 
them as being in possession of the above qualifications and com-
p~tent to act as a legal procurator. The present Code contains no 
substantial divergences from the above, saving that the qualifica-
tion at (c) has been adequately tightened in the sense that mere 
attendance at University lectures is not enough, but the applicant 
must be approved by th_e examining board of the Faculty of Law. 
This amendment was made by Ordinance No. IX of 1886. The quali-
ficatiqn at (d) has been amended by the condition that the perio.d of 
practice must be subsequent to the passing of the examination men-
tioned at ( c). Approval in this examination entitles the successful 
candidate to a University diploma~ 
IV OTHER RIGHTS AND DUTIES 
Now as to their various other rights and duties under the law.ad· 
vocates and legal procurators are subject to much .the same prin-
ciples and rules. 
1. Liability 
And first, taking the que~tion of liability towards their clients 
the basic principle repeated in a string of judgments is that liabili-
ty must be subject to the proof of malice (do/us) or fault (culpa), 
and that a legal practitioner is not liable in damages merely because 
he is found to have acted in error, unless the error be so manifest 
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as to force to the condusion that it was born of culpable ignorance 
or evident incompetence (Court of Appeal, Cremona vs Cremona, 
February 13, 1905; also Barbara vs Notary Vella, January l, 1929, 
per Mercieca C.J., R.F. Ganado and P. Pullicino JJ., Vol. XXVII, 
Part I, p. 262; and more recently Buttigieg vs Hirst noe, February 
VS, 1945, per Borg C.J ., Camilleri and Hai:ding -1 J .). This is by no 
means a far cry from para. 6 of Title VIII of the Costituzioni di 
Manoel, which, while rendering advocates and legal procurators 
liable in damages, costs and interest in favour of their, client in the 
event of a cause being lost through' their fault or ignorance, res-
tricted such liability to cases of sup in a, manifest a ed inescusabile 
colpa ed ignoranza principalmente ex defectu solemnium et forma-
litatis processus. 
2. Privileged communications _ 
Communications made to a .legal procurator are privileged as in 
the case of an advocate, provided in both. cases they have been 
made in professional confidence (Sec. 638 ·Criminal Code and Sec. 
581 Code of Organization and Civ.il . Procedure). The latter provi-
sion adds an important condition in the sense that the communica-
tion must be made 'in reference to a cause.' The inviolability of 
professional secrecy has also been extended to documents obtained 
in professional confidence (Law Reports, Vol. XXV, Part I, p. 799, 
and Vol. XXVI, _ Part I, p. 20). -An interesting judgment is reported 
at Vol. III, p. 497 of the Law. Reports, where the Civil Court allow-
ed the plaintiff, in spite of objection raised by the defendant, to 
call as a witness a legal procurator in order to testify on facts 
learned from defendant's mother in the course of giv:ing her profes-
sional assistance in_ certain judicial proceedings against defendant 
himself. The Court, admitting the evidence, held that the above 
quoted Section 587 of the Code of Procedure (then Section 599) re· 
ferred only to circumstances learned from the parties to the suit.or 
to facts . which might affect the legal procurator's or advocate•s 
client, but not to third parties. The legal procurator was in fact or· 
dered by the Court to reply to all questions put to him as long as 
they did not affect the property or interests of defendant's mother. 
The point does not seem to have been tested again in any reported 
case and it is perhaps a matter .for conjecture whether a similar 
ruling would be given to-day. The English .practice does not seem 
to be in agreement with .the view held by the ~ourt, and Taylor (On 
Evidence, 12th .Edit., Vol. I, p. 580, para 919), ·says that 'the pro-
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tection afforded to professional confidence applies with equal force 
though the client be in no shape before the court.' In the case of a 
solicitor called upon by subpoena or otherwise to produce a docu-
ment with which he has been confidentially entrusted by some 
stranger to the suit, if he claimed the privilege of the client, he 
would be protected not only fro.m producing the document but from 
answering any questio.ns with .regard to its nature. He concludes by 
stating that though there have been precedents in which the Court 
has inspected the document and pronounced on its admissibility, it. 
seems to be now settled that in strict law the judge ought not to 
look at the writing to see whether it is a -document which .may pro· 
pedy by withheld. Of course, in our case, the wording of the text 
seems to argue that the communication, co be privileged, must be 
made not only in professional confidence but also in reference to 
the cause and this last phrase is bound co play an important part in 
the determination of such an issue. 
3 . .P actum quotae litis 
Legal procurators, like advocates, are debarred by Section 81 of 
the Code of Organizatiqo and Ci vii. Procedure from entering iato any 
agreement or stipulation quotae litis, which by Sectio.n 1029 of the 
Civil Code is declared to be void. This refers to agreements where· 
by an advocate o~ legal procurator stipulates that in the event of a 
successful·outcome of the cause he shall receive a determined por· 
tion of the award, that is. to say, he actually purchases the cause 
entrusted to him. 1n· our law this was also prohibited by the Code 
de Rohan (Book V, Chap. IX, para •. 1), and after the repeal of that 
Code, was re-introduced by Section 37 of Ordinance V of 1859, later 
incorporated as Section fJ92 of Ordinance No. VII of 1868 (now Sec-
tion 1029 of the Civil Code) as far as concerns the civil.law, and 
by Section 100 of Ordinance No. IV of 1854 as regards the law. of 
procedure. The origin of this provision goes back to Roman Law_ 
(L. 1, para. 12 D. de extraordinaria cogni ti one (L. 13); L. 53, D. de 
pactis (II. 14). Micallef (op. cit. p. 155) describes it as an odious 
contract which is an impediment to the amicable settlement of law-
suits and it. is, of course, absolutely below the dignity of the legal 
profession. In the case Dr. G. M. Camilleri vs. W. Parkey noe 
(7/9/1973) the Court of Appeal held chat an agre.ement for fees pay· 
able to a lawyer in respect of extra-judicial services was not inva· 
lid by reason of the prohibition of the pactum quotae litis, there be· 
ing no lis, and that the provisions of the Code of Organisation and 
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Ci v:il. Procedure relating to the taxing of fees for such services aE 
plied only where there is no such .previous agreement. 
While on this point it may be as well to recall that though .thet 
is no express provision of law. on the subject, legal doctrine ha 
extended the nullity of the pact quotae litis to any stipulation ~ 
which any legal practitioner agrees not to be paid any part of hi 
fees except in the event of the cause being won (Giorgi, Obbliga: 
ioni, Vol. III, para •. 377; and our Law Reports Vol. XXVII, Part. I, I 
225). 
V RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 
As to the rules of pro.fessional conduct legal procurators a 
likewise subject to the same rules as advocates. The law on th 
point is to be found at Book III Title XVII of the Code of Organiz. 
tian and Civil.. Procedure, entitled 0 f Respect Due to the Court ar. 
of the f?iscipline of th-e Legal Profession, the main provisions • 
which are the following: 
Section 9.90 provi4es punishment of fine (multa or ammenda) 
detention for contempt of Co1.1rt by the use of indecent words 
gestures during the sitting or insulting any person. 
Section 992 provides that in serious cases the Court may cor 
demo the advocate _ or legal procurator to interdiction from his pri 
fession for not more than one month. 
Section 993 provides against the use of insulting or offensi· 
words if. not necessary for the cause in any written pleading. 
Section 995 directs the Courts to repress any .excess on the pa 
of an advocate or a legal procurator in the discharge of his dutie 
and at the same time to ensure the most ample liberty to any adv 
cate or legal procurator in the dis.charge _o·f his duties consistent 
with .the law:, and to repress any improper behaviour towards him. 
These provisions, however, cover only .cases of actual contem1 
of court, and, saving Section 82 of the same Code and Sections 1 
and 121 of the Criminal Code, which cover cas~s of extremely ra 
application, there was no pro.vision in the law, at least up to 191 
for the exercise of discipline over the profession by the Courts. I 
Ordinance No. XV of 1913, due to the work of the Royal Commissi 
of 1911, which had shown an evident interest in the matter (Minut 
of Evidence, p. 218, questions 8071 to 8077 and Report, under t 
heading of The Legal Pro.fession, para. 261, pp. 37, 38) an .amen 
ment was bro.ught to Section 995 empowering the Court of Appeal 
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inquire into any complaint made to it by the Attorney·General or by 
the President of the Chamber of Advocates regarding any abuse or 
misconduct attributed to any advocate or legal procurator in the 
exercise of his profession and in connection with his professional 
duties. The Court may repress such abuse or misconduct by rep-
rimand, ammenda, multa, detention or temporary interdiction from 
the profession after allowing the practitioner full opportunity for 
his defence. 
By a further amendment brought by Ordinance No. II of 1947 the 
employment of touts and any agreement between advocates, notaries 
and legal procurators for .the sharing out between them of fees . 
earned in respect of professional work v.·ere declared to be abuses 
within the meaning of the section. The right of bringing complaints 
before the Court of Appeal was by 'this Ordinance also extended to 
the Registrar of the Courts. 
Thus between the promulgation of the law of procedu~e in 1854 
and 1913 there was really no provision for the discipline of the 
profession in cases of misconduct not of a criminal nature. But it 
is interesting to note that by a Minute dated October 28, 1816, pub-
lished in the Government Gazette, the Governor 'deemed it expe-
dient to state to His Majesty's Judges, that they had power to sus-
pend an advocate from his functions only for 'notorious, flagrant 
and evident corruption and misconduct or for actual contempt of 
Coure, but that in all other cases they had co notify the Government 
of any exception taken against an advocate. The Code de Rohan 
(Book I, Chap. XL, paragraphs XXI, XXII) laid down that cif. any 
advocate or procurator shall put aside his integrity and honesty and 
shall have no other purpose but that of increasing the number of 
law-suits entrusted t<;> him, or, to please litigants, shall give way 
too easily to their wishes, vexing others with delays and unjust 
claims; he shall be debarred from carrying out his functions. If he 
shall fall short of his other duties or fail. to comply with .the provi-
sions of this chapter, he shall be liable to suspension, and all ag-
reements entered into by him shall be void'. The Code, however, 
failed to state by whom these penalties were to be applied. 
Under the present law both advocates and legal procurators are 
also subj ecc to two provisions of the Criminal Code. Section 120 
renders them liable to a fine and to temporary. interdiction from their 
office, if, having commenced to act for one party, they shall in the 
same law· suit or in any other matter involving the same interest, in 
opposition to such party or any person claiming under him, change 
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over withou~ his consent, and act on behalf of the opposite party. 
This provision of the Criminal Code was by .no means an innovation 
as it was included, though .in a somewhat differe.nt wording, in the 
Code de Rohan (Book I, Chap. XL, para. 10) as well as in the Cos-
tituzioni di Manoel (Tit. VIII, para. VII). . 
By Section ~21 of the Criminal Code any advocate or legal pro-
curator who shall. betray the interests of his client in such a man-
ner that in consequence of his betrayal or deceitful omission, the 
client shall lose the cause or any right shall be barred to his pre-
judice, is liable to hard labour from seven to eighteen months and 
to perpetual interdiction from his profession. There seems to have 
been no equivalent provision in the Code de Rohan and the provi-
sion of para. VI of Tit. VIII of the Costituzioni di Manoel (supra) 
seems to have contemplated only cases of negligence and not of 
malicious intention. Of course these provisions of the Criminal 
Code are quite formidable but there seems to be no reported case in 
which th~y have been applied. 
Section 82 of the Code of Organization and Civil Procedure, 
moreover, provides that a conviction of any crime liable to impri-
sonment for a term exceeding one year other than involuntary homi· 
cide or a crime excusable in terms of the Criminal Code, shall be 
a cause of perpetual disability to practise the pr·ofession of advo· 
cate. The Governor may at any time remove the disability. Legal 
procurators are also subject to this provision (Section 86). 
In paragraph V of Title -VIII of the Costituzioni di Manoel we find 
a provision whereby an advocate or legal procurator, having embark-
ed on a cause, was obliged, unless excused by a just cause, to 
continuf; his defence of it up to the last act of execution of the 
judgement. This provision was not reproduced in the Code de Rohan 
(Micallef, op. cit. p. 156) and finds no counterpart in the law of to· 
day, and indeed it appears to be in conflict with the principle that 
legal practitioners exercise their profession freely, so much so that 
Item No. 28 of Tariff G appended to the Code of Organization and 
Civil Procedure fixes a fee for the advocate who abandons or is 
abandoned by his client. Of course, there is nowadays the same 
restraint, but coming from a different source, that is, the ethics of 
the profession, as no self-respecting legal practitio·ner will aban-
don his client midway through a cause without a good reason, though 




1. How established 
As to the question of fees and other remuneration for the servic-
es of legal procurators the law thereon has also been evolved with-
in the same framework as that concerning advocates. 
Starting from the Costituzioni di Manoel we find therein a whole 
Title (XXIX) on the fees payable to judges, advocates and others, 
and Chapter IV of this title deals particularly with the fees of ad-
vocates and legal procurators. It contains a paragraph fixing their 
fees even in criminal matters, a field in which the present Criminal 
Code does not enter except in so far as concerns criminal cases 
before the Courts of Magistrates. Unfortunately, the relative Sche-
dule C has not been revised since its first introduction in 1921 
and the statutory maximum is therefore definitely on the low side. 
The provision of those Constitutions which is of greatest interest 
to the present subject is paragraph ·xvi which provided that the fee 
payable by the client was to be divided into three parts, two to go 
to the advocate and one to the procurator. As we shall see this pro-
portion was later changed, the legal procurator becoming entitled to 
only a third of the fee due to the advocate. Paragraph XXIV of the 
same title laid down that any advocate or legal procurator who exact-
ed a higher fee than that allowed by law was co be deemed guilty 
of extortion. The only corresponding provision in the law of to-day 
is Section 80 of the Code of Organization and Civil Procedure (sup· 
ra). 
In the Code de Rohan we do not find a separate pro·vision deal-
ing with fees, but the subject is taken together with the qualifica-
tions and duties of advocates and legal procurators at Book I, 
Chapter XL. The fees were not laid down specifically, buc that 
there was some system of taxing them is obvious from paragraph 
XIII, which provided that advocates could not claim fees higher 
than those taxed in their favour, and chat it was not lawful forthem 
to agree with their clients in any other manner, saving their right 
to accept any higher reward offered spontaneously by a client. 
Where, however, (para. XX) any of the parties to a suit wished to 
engage a procurator, such party and the procurator could come to a 
private agreement as to the fee payable to the latter. Micallef (op. 
cit. p. 160) emphasises this difference between the two branches 
of the profession, since advocates could not in view of the above 
mentioned provision of the Code de Rohan come to a similar pri· 
.. 
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vate agreement. In the absence of such an agreement the client had 
to pay the procurator one third of the whole fee payable to the ad-
vocate. This marked a substantial difference from the moiety of the 
whole fee for the case allotted to the procurator under the laws of 
Manoel, and the fee payable to the legal procurator in the Supedor 
Courts bas remained fixed at one third of the advocate' s fee ever 
since. This provision of the Code de Rohan ended by stating that 
where the procurator was engaged by the advocate, the latter had 
to pay the former out of his own fee. This rule has not been repro-
duced. Indeed, as we have seen, the client has to meet the fee of 
the legal procurator engaged by his advocate. 
Both the Costituzioni di Manoel (Title XXIX, Chap. IV, para. 
XXV) and the Code de Rohat:l (Book VII, Chap. XVIII, para. XXVII) 
contained a provision to the effect that in· mercantile matters, where 
an advocate or procurator had been permitted to appear in the office 
of the Consolata del Mare his fee was taxable at only one third of 
that taxed in favour of the Consuls and Assessors. 
We next come to the Proclamation of October 15, 1827 the main 
provisions of which have already been examined. As to the fees of 
the procurator it was provided therein (Section 6) that if he had 
carried out his duties with diligence, ability and honesty he was 
entitled to any reasonable fee which his client agreed to pay him, 
and, in the absence of such an agreement to a fee proportionate to 
the importance of the suit, to the time and labour devoted thereto, 
the financial condition of the client, such fee to _be taxed by the 
Court of trial and to be recoverable even by an executive warrant. 
It will be noted that this Proclamation did not specify any pro· 
portion between the fee of the advocate and that of the procurator. 
However, we have it on the authority of Micallef (op. -c.it. p. 160) 
that it was not the practice to tax the procurator's fee at more than 
one third of that of the advocate. 
Now, as to the law today, the main provision is at Sec. 1003 of 
the Code of Organization and Civil Procedure which states that 
costs are taxed and levied in accordance with the Tariff in Sche-
dule A annexed to that Code. Tariff G of this Schedule is entitled 
'Fees Payable to Advocates, Legal Procurators and Official Cura-
tors', and No. 32 of the Tariff lays down that legal procurators 
shall receive one third of the fees allowed to advocates, with a 
few exceptions principally regarding work which either according 
to law or the custom of the profession is not done by procurators 
but by advocates. In the case of these exceptions, such as, for 
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example, an opinion or for drafting a deed or perusing a. draft deed 
to be published by a notary, the law apparently does not fix any 
fee for the legal procurator, but it is equally true that if he does 
this kind of work he is not thereby doing anything which is against 
the law and he is therefore entitleq to some remuneration as a non-
gratuitous agent or as a locator op erum. This was held in re Pa· 
rascandolo vs P. L. L anzon (Court of Appeal April 17, 1925 per Mer-
cieca C.J., G. Agius and L. Camilleri J J ., Vol. XXVI Part I p. 83 of 
the Law Reports.) 
The fees of legal procurators, together with those of advocates, 
when required to appear before the Inferior Courts, are fixed by No. 
34 of the Tariff. Those in respect of sea·protests or proceedings 
concerning average in the Commercial Court are fixed by Tariff N. 
As to the fees payable to advocates, legal procurators and notar-
ies in respect of extra-judicial services, their taxation falls within 
the competence of the Court of Voluntary Jurisdiction under whose 
authority the Registrar taxes such services on the demand of any 
interested party, saving the right of appeal by a writ of summons, 
within one month, to the Court of Contentious Jurisdiction. The de· 
mand for the taxation is made by means of a note showing the ser-
vices in respect of which it is demanded, and the note, if the de-
mand is made by the creditor has to be confirmed by him on oath. 
(Sec. 555 Code of Organization and Civil Procedure). 
The main difference between taxed bills obtained under the 
above-mentioned provision and taxed bills in respect ·of judicial 
fees and disbursements is that the latter provide, while the former 
do not, the advocate or legal procurator in whose favour they are 
issued with an executive title, that is, the right of recovery of the 
sum approved thereon may be enforced by an executi.ve warrant af-
ter the lapse of at least two days from the service of an intimation 
'for payment. made by a judicial act, generally an official letter, 
provided, of course, the taxed bill has not in the meantime been 
impugned by the debtor. The time limit for impugning a taxed bill 
is also in this case one month [Secs. 251 ( c), 254 (2), 27 4, <52 of the 
Code of Organization and Civil Procedure]. 
2. Privilege 
In certain cases legal procurators, like advocates, have a privi-
lege, that is to say, a right of preference over other creditors, ev-
en hypothecary ones, for the recovery of their fees and expenses. 
In our law privileges, of course, may exist over movables as well 
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as over immovables and they may be e-ither general or special 
(Secs. 2103, 2104, 2105 Civil Code), and the privilege here under 
review is a special one. As far as it concerns movables it operates 
in favour of the advocate and legal procurator over the particular 
thing ·which is recovered. by means of the action wherein they are 
engaged, and their fees and disbursements in respect of which are 
therefore so secured (Sec. 2ll.3(d) Civil Code). As to immovables, 
it applies in their favour for the fees and expenses due to them in 
the action for the recovery of an immovable, over the immovable it-
self, if recovered (Sec. 2114 ( c) Civil Code). It was explained by 
G. Pullicino J., in Dr. 9aruana vs Sacco (Civil Court, First Hall, 
October 13, 1899, Law Reports Vol. XVII, Part II, p. 125) that the 
justification of this right of preference is that it guarantees ade-
quately to lawyers the honorarium due to them in so much as their 
services are beneficial to their debtor, and ·that · it prevents the 
possibility of these services being exploited by third parties. This 
privilege was recognised in the practice of our Courts even before 
it was placed on the statute book by Sir Adrian Dingli through Or-
dinance No. XI of 1856 . and is founded on the rule of equity nemi-
nem licet locupletari cum aliena jactura (Vide Micallef op. cit. p. 
162; and Law Repo.rts, Volume of Judgments January-June 1841 p. 
166). In the first quoted judgment it was held that the privilege con-
tinues to exist even if the recovery is obtained as a result of a 
compromise, and in the second and older judgment the right of pre-
ference was placed higher than that of a wife claiming by a reason 
of dowry. 
3. Prescription 
And lastly the law regarding the prescription of the action of le-
gal procurators for their fees and disbursements is the same as that 
touching advocates. Section 2254(c) of the Civil Code, in fact, 
states that their action, like that of notaries, architects and other 
persons exercising a profession or liberal art is barred by the lapse 
of two years. 
The present law in this respect is somewhat divergent from the 
old law on the subject. The Costituzioni di Mano el (Tide XII, para. 
LXVI) after laying down that the institute of prescription 4being 
founded on the canon and civil law,' was to be recognised by the 
Courts, went on to say that 'in the case of personal services such 
as Doctors, Surgeons, Advocates or Procurators or other privileged 
persons, in adherence to Chapter 62 of King Ferdinand, the right of 
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action for their services is prescribed by the lapse of five years'. 
The Code de Rohan (Book II, Oiap. V., paras. 3, 4) fixed this per· 
iod at five years during the lifetime of the debtor or one year from 
his death, the latter period to run a die sci en ti ae. 
As Micallef (op. cit. p. 315) points out this period of pre·scription 
is a cbrieP one, that is, it renders the right of action and the credit 
to which it relates ineffective but it does not extinguish them, and 
it is founded on the presumption of payment in view of the effluxion 
of the time determined by law. Consequently the advocate or legal 
procurator against whom this plea may be sec up in bar may subject 
the debtor to the oath as to whether he can declare that he is not 
debtor or that he does not remember whether the sum has been 
paid. In the event of the oath being deferred to the heirs of the al· 
leged debtor, the ·plea shall not be effectual if such heirs do not 
declare that they do not know that the sum is due. This rule is now 
laid down in Section 2365 ( l) of our Civil Code. 
With regard to cbrief' prescriptions of this nature it is safe to 
state that i~ is now well settled that they may be set up by the of· 
ficial curators of an absent person or of a vacant inheritance with· 
out their being bound to take the oath under that section of the 
Code. There was for a long time much controversy on this point 
and the earlier judgments were in a contrary sense (Law Reports 
Vol. VI, p. 396; Vol. VIII, p. 471; Vol. XI, p. 254; Vol. XllI, p. 61; 
Vol. XXIV, II, 684; Vol. XXV, I, 624). Gradually, however, the 
Courts came more and more into line with the view that the right to 
subject the alleged debtor to the oath is only a means of rebuttal 
of the plea of prescription, of which the creditor is deprived in this 
case, thus leaving the plea unrebutted (Law Reports, Vol. IX, p. 
459; Vol. XIII, p. 112, a judgment of Sir Adrian Dingli; Vol. XVI, p. 
298; Vol. XX, I, 213; Vol. XXVIII, III, 1251; Vol. XXX, I, 27; and 
also Baudry·Lacantinerie & Tissier, Prescrizioni, p. 746; Ricci, 
Vol. V, p. 285; Giorgi, Vol. VIII, para. 398). 
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